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circuit court, with instructions to enter ajudgment in favor of Dwyer's
counterclaim, awarding Dwyer exclusive rights to the Quarry.
In 1925, LaSalle National Bank acquired title to the abandoned,
water-filled limestone Quarry in South Elgin, Illinois. Dwyer is the sole
beneficiary of the trust that includes title to the Quarry. Until a 1997
drowning, Dwyer permitted adjacent landowners to use the Quarry for
swimming.
Following the drowning, Dwyer prohibited further
recreational use of the Quarry, and requested that adjacent
landowners erect fences around the Quarry to prevent unauthorized
access. Dwyer also erected his own fences where adjacent landowners
had not.
In Illinois, if a body of water rises onto a landowner's property
enough to denude it of vegetation, that portion of land is considered
part of the lakebed. If a landowner owns a portion of a lakebed, the
landowner is given the right to make reasonable use and enjoyment of
the surface waters of the entire lake. The circuit court held that the
Quarry constituted a lake, and because a portion of it rested on the
Nottolinis' property, denuding it of vegetation, the Nottolinis were
entitled to a right of reasonable use and enjoyment of the entire
surface of the Quarry.
Prior to this case, no court in Illinois had addressed the question of
whether a water-filled Quarry could be defined as a lake, nor had any
Illinois court ever defined the term "lake." The appellate court
examined the definitions of "lake" utilized by other jurisdictions, and
adopted the definition of a lake as a reasonably permanent body of
water at rest in a depression of the earth, if both depression and body
of water are of natural origin.
The appellate court then applied this definition to the facts of the
case. The Quarry was a man-made body of water, and was therefore
not of natural origin. The court could not define the Quarry as a lake,
and as a result, the Nottolinis' ownership of a portion of its bed did
not provide them with any right to use the entirety of the Quarry's
surface water.
Steven j Rypma
MASSACHUSETTS
Greater Lawrence Sanitary Dist. v. Town of N. Andover, 785 N.E.2d
337 (Mass. 2003) (holding the doctrines of preemption and essential
government function do not prohibit a municipality from regulating
an inter-municipal sanitation district to the extent the regulations do
not interfere with the sanitation district's essential functions or the
state regulatory regime).
The Greater Lawrence Sanitation District ("GLSD") sued the Town
of North Andover, its Board of health and its Board of selectmen

Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

("Town") in the Essex Superior Court for an injunction to prevent the
Town from exerting control over or interfering with GLSD, and for
the return of $200,000 GLSD paid the Town for a building permit. At
trial both parties filed motions for summaryjudgment. The trial court
granted GLSD's motion, broadly ruling the Town had no authority to
impose conditions on the facilities' development. The trial court
reasoned "GLSD is a legislatively created body performing an essential
government function and therefore is immune from municipal
regulation."
The trial court also reasoned the Massachusetts
Department of Environmental Protection ("Department") had plenary
authority to regulate the facilities, preempting municipal regulation.
The trial court further ordered the Town to grant a new building
permit without conditions or charge, and ruled all other issues
regarding the permit moot. Both parties appealed and the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts granted application for direct
appellate review.
In 1997, the Massachusetts Legislature authorized GLSD to build
an "on site biosolids processing Facility" and to contract for the
"disposal and beneficial use of sludge related thereto." By 1998, GLSD
had a plan for such a facility ("Facility I") and also for a facility to turn
waste sludge into commercially viable fertilizer pellets ("Facility II").
GLSD sought and gained approval from the Department, the Town's
conservation commission and the FAA (this was necessary because of a
smokestack at Facility II) for both facilities.
The Town requested, and GLSD paid, a $200,000 building permit
application fee during planning and development of the facilities. In
March of 2000, the parties executed a memorandum of understanding
("Initial MOU") to alleviate disagreements over the Town's authority
to regulate the facilities' development. The Initial MOU recognized
the disagreements but provided process for the Town's Board of
health ("Board") to review environmental, health and safety impacts of
the development. On June 18, 2000, the Town issued building permits
for both facilities, but stated in the permits that the Board might still
disapprove of or impose conditions on the facilities' development.
The next day, the Board approved Facility I but not Facility II. GLSD
commenced this action in July 2000. In September, the Board
rescinded its disapproval of Facility II and in November issued a final
memorandum of understanding ("Final MOU") imposing numerous
conditions on Facility II.
The court began its analysis with the Town's authority to impose
conditions on the facilities' development. The court recognized that,
absent a statutory "municipal veto," the doctrine of essential
government function proscribes municipalities from interfering with
the legislatively mandated purpose of legislatively created agencies or
entities. The court further recognized the trial court's ruling that
GLSD was such an agency performing an essential government
function. The court noted this did not grant GLSD immunity from all
municipal regulation.
Rather, GLSD "remains subject to
regulations ...that do not interfere with its ability to fulfill its essential
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governmental purposes and have only a negligible effect on its
operations." The court ruled that whether the conditions the Town
imposed passed this test was a factual issue to be resolved on remand.
The court then turned to whether the Department's regulatory
authority preempted the Town from imposing conditions on water
and air quality. The Department has broad authority to regulate water
and air quality, particularly that of the facilities. The court concluded
the Department's regulatory authority did not preempt but restricted
municipal regulation. Specifically, the Town may impose conditions
consistent with the Department's regulations. The court held the
question of whether the conditions were inconsistent with the
Department's regulations was a factual issue to be resolved on remand.
The court then addressed the Town's claim that it had statutory
authority to issue the conditions. The court noted the Town issued
the conditions as part of the Final MOU based on contractual
authority from the Initial MOU. The court further noted that the
Town relied on this contractual authority at trial and held the record
was incomplete to resolve the question of whether the Town had such
statutory authority. The court held this question to be an issue for
resolution upon remand.
The court finally turned to the issue of the building permit fee.
GLSD claimed that because the trial court found the Department
preempted the Town from regulating GLSD, the Town should refund
the full $200,000 fee. The court noted the premise of GLSD's claimpreemption-was incorrect. The court further noted state statutes
specifically charged the local building inspector with enforcement of
the state building code as to any "building or structure within the city
or Town... including any building or structure owned by any
authority established by the legislature but not owned by the
Commonwealth." The court noted GLSD was such an authority, that
nothing in its enabling statute or the building code exempted GLSD
from local inspection, and that local inspection did not interfere with
GLSD's essential government function. The court held, therefore,
that GLSD must "obtain a building permit, in compliance with the
State Building Code, as enforced by the local inspector." The court
held the issue of the Town's contractual obligation to refund the fee
under the initial MOU was an issue for resolution on remand.
James Parrot

MICHIGAN
Eberhard Lake Ass'n v. Walters, No. 234586, 2002 Mich. App. LEXIS
2256 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2002) (holding that to survive a motion
for summary judgment, the party opposing the motion must present
evidence that the riparian owner's use of water is unreasonable).

